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We study how learning aﬀects an uninformed monopolist￿s supply and investment decisions
under multiplicative uncertainty in demand. The monopolist is uninformed because it does
not know one of the parameters de￿ning the distribution of the random demand. Observing
prices reveals this information slowly. We ￿rst show how to incorporate Bayesian learning
into dynamic programming by focusing on suﬃcient statistics and conjugate families of
distributions. We show their necessity in dynamic programming to be able to solve dynamic
programs either analytically or numerically. This is important since it is not true that a
solution to the in￿nite-horizon program can be found either analytically or numerically for
any kinds of distributions. We then use speci￿c distributions to study the monopolist￿s
behavior. Speci￿cally, we rely on the fact that the family of normal distributions with an
unknown mean is a conjugate family for samples from a normal distribution to obtain closed-
form solutions for the optimal supply and investment decisions. This enables us to study
the eﬀect of learning on supply and investment decisions, as well as the steady state level of
capital. Our ￿ndings are as follows. Learning aﬀects the monopolist￿s behavior. The higher
the expected mean of the demand shock given its beliefs, the higher the supply and the lower
the investment. Although learning does not aﬀect the steady state level of capital since the
uninformed monopolist becomes informed in the limit, it reduces the speed of convergence
to the steady state.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The evolution of capital speci￿ct oa￿rm plays a key role in how it develops over time as well
as its optimal supply and investment decisions. Taking the price of capital used by a ￿rm
as given, as if the ￿rm was a perfect competitor in the capital market, misses the fact that
there is capital speci￿ct oa￿rm that can only be moved between ￿r m sa tan o n l i n e a rc o s t .
Both human and physical capital have this property. Moreover, how well-informed a ￿rm is
about the structure of demand or the production process plays a crucial role in the dynamic
analysis of the ￿rm. For instance, a ￿rm might be uninformed about the distribution of the
random demand or the random production process. In that case, it has the opportunity
to learn through experience. In other words, there is a relationship between the evolution
of a ￿rm through capital accumulation and information acquisition about the structure of
demand or the production process.
The issue of investment under uncertainty without learning has been studied extensively
in optimal growth. In the early literature on optimal growth, the dynamic equation governing
capital formation was deterministic, see Cass [5] and Koopmans [21]. This was a natural place
to begin the study of optimal growth since growth had already been studied in a deterministic
environment by Ramsey [26] and the technology for studying the problem in a more general,
stochastic, environment had not yet been fully developed. This was changed by the optimal
growth model of Brock and Mirman [4] which built on earlier studies of positive growth
under uncertainty. The motivation for studying stochastic rather than deterministic growth
models was to reduce the information available to the economic agents in order to provide
more realistic results. Indeed, in deterministic models, the economic agents are assumed to
have perfect foresight in understanding the eﬀect of their decisions on the future evolution of
the dynamic system. Adding uncertainty in thed y n a m i c sm e a n st h a tt h ee c o n o m i ca g e n t s
need not know precisely every outcome of their investment decisions, i.e., they need not
know with certainty the eﬀect of their investment decisions on the future path of the system.
Although the assumption of stochastic growth is less restrictive than the original one of
deterministic dynamics, it is still quite restrictive since it requires that the economic agents
1know precisely the stochastic eﬀect of their investment decisions on the future evolution of the
dynamic system, i.e., perfect foresight is replaced by rational expectations. It would be even
more useful and realistic to study models in which the future outcome of present decisions is
even murkier by assuming that the economic agents do not have complete knowledge of the
distribution of future stochastic outcomes. For instance, suppose that the economic agents
do not know about a parameter characterizing the distribution. They would then have to
learn about the environment they face. Rational expectations would then be applied not only
on the stochastic variables as in the economic growth literature but also on the stochastic
learning process. This change in modeling would lead to a better understanding of the eﬀect
of optimal decisions on the dynamics of the economy and yield a more precise understanding
of optimal saving and consumption than is currently available in economic growth models.
It is natural to expect that the ideas from the growth literature play an important role as
well in the study of ￿rms faced with dynamic output decisions through the accumulation of
speci￿c capital.
There is an emerging literature studying the eﬀect of learning in dynamic models of
economic growth as well as more general dynamic models, beginning with the paper of
Freixas [15], but also including the works of El-Gamal and Sundaram [12], Bertocchi and
Spagat [3], and Datta et al. [7]. These studies are, in turn, based on the models of learning
in which the only link between periods is beliefs. See Prescott [25], Grossman et al. [18],
Easley and Kiefer [10,11], Balvers and Cosimano [2], Aghion et al. [1], Fusselman and
Mirman [16], Mirman et al. [24], Tre￿er [30], Creane [6], Fishman and Gandal [13], and
Keller and Rady [19]. In these models, there is no natural dynamics and thus no possibility
to study investment. To the issues studied in these nondynamic models, the introduction
of a natural dynamics adds a rich and complicated set of questions and issues that have
either been studied super￿cially in the literature or have not yet been addressed. In fact,
there are many aspects that must be considered when studying the eﬀect of learning and
experimentation in dynamic models. For instance, the unknown parameter could be in the
objective function, in the dynamic equation, or in both.
Although learning may be studied in the context of economic growth models, we focus
2on industrial organization. Speci￿cally, we study how learning aﬀects the behavior of an
uninformed monopolist in a dynamic model with capital that is speci￿ct ot h e￿rm, along
the lines studied in Koulovatianos and Mirman [22]. The monopolist faces multiplicative
uncertainty in demand and is uninformed because he does not know one of the parameters
de￿ning the distribution of the random demand. There is no uncertainty or learning from the
production process for capital. Observing prices reveals this information slowly. Both active
or passive learning can be studied in our model depending on the parameter unknown to the
monopolist. Active learning arisesw h e nt h em o n o p o l i s t ￿ sd e c i s i o n sa ﬀect the information
used to learn about the unknown parameter while passive learning arises when the monop-
olist￿s decisions do not aﬀect the information used to learn about the unknown parameter.
It is the purpose of this paper to study the case of passive learning.
Incorporating learning into dynamic program brings another diﬃculty. It is that of
modeling appropriately the distribution of the random demand along with the distribution
that characterizes the prior belief about the unknown parameter of the distribution of the
random demand. We discuss suﬃcient statistics and conjugate families of distributions and
show their necessity in dynamic programming to be able to solve dynamic programs either
analytically or numerically. This is important since it is not true that a solution to the
in￿nite-horizon program can be found either analytically or numerically for any kinds of
distributions.
We then use speci￿c distributions to study the monopolist￿s behavior. Speci￿cally, we
rely on the fact the family of normal distributions with an unknown mean is a conjugate
family for samples from a normal distribution to obtain closed-form solution for optimal
supply and investment decisions. This enables us to study the eﬀect of learning on supply
and investment decisions, as well as the steady state level of capital. In fact, we show that
learning plays an important role in the optimal supply and investment decision of the ￿rm.
In our model, the demand shock is multiplica t i v ei nd e m a n ds ot h a t l e a r n i n gh a sn oe ﬀect on
the monopolist￿s behavior if there is no cost function. When there is a cost function, learning
aﬀects the monopolist￿s behavior. The higher the expected mean of the demand shock given
its beliefs, the higher the supply and the lower the investment. Although learning does not
3aﬀect the steady state level of capital since the uninformed monopolist becomes informed in
the limit, it reduces the speed of convergence to the steady state.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the general model. We ￿rst
discuss the dynamic framework in section 2.1, then the learning framework in section 2.2.
The dynamic framework is combined with the passive learning framework in section 2.3.
Bayesian statistics and techniques are discussed in section 3. The eﬀect of learning is studied
in section 4. All proofs are relegated to section 5.
2 The General Model
2.1 The Dynamic Framework
Consider an in￿nitely-lived monopolist who makes supply and investment decisions under
uncertainty in demand in order to maximize the sum of discounted expected pro￿ts subject to
a deterministic law of motion for capital. The monopolist supplies J ≥ 1 exclusive markets.
In period t, the monopolist is endowed with a stock of capital kt yielding output f (kt), from
which qjt ≥ 0 is supplied to market j, j =1 ,...,J,a n d
kt+1 = f (kt) − ζ
J X
j=1
qjt ≥ 0( 1 )
is invested. Here, ζ > 0 characterizes the impact of extraction on the stock of capital in
periodt+1. The total cost of supplying
PJ







The monopolist faces uncertainty in demand: the price Pjt is a realization of the random
price ￿ Pjt in market j with ￿ Pjt = g(qjt,γ,￿ εjt), ∂g/∂qjt < 0, where γ ∈ Γ is a parameter
(possibly in￿nitely-dimensioned) and ￿ εjt is a market and time-speci￿cd e m a n ds h o c k . L e t
{￿ εjt}
J
j=1 be i.i.d. across markets and periods with p.d.f. φε (εjt|θ) > 0, εjt ∈ Ωε, depending
on a parameter θ ∈ Θ, possibly in￿nitely-dimensioned. Hence, the distribution of ￿ Pjt depends
on the quantity qjt supplied to market j in period t, but not on the quantity qsr supplied
to market s in period r, s 6= j,r 6= t.S i n c e{￿ εjt}
J
j=1 are i.i.d. across markets and periods,
￿ Pjt|qjt, j =1 ,...,J, t =1 ,..., are independently and identically distributed across markets
4and periods.






















where δ ∈ [0,1] is the discount factor, subject to the law of motion (1) for capital.
2.2 The Learning Framework
Including parameters γ and θ in the model allows us to study the eﬀect of learning in economic
models. Three cases are distinguished. First, the monopolist is uninformed only about the
value of θ. Second, it is uninformed only about the value of γ. Third, it is uninformed
about the values of both γ and θ.T h e r e i s a d i ﬀerence between learning about the value
of γ and learning about the value of θ,n a m e l y ,t h ed i ﬀerence between active and passive
learning.1 Loosely speaking, under active learning, the monopolist￿s supply and investment
decisions aﬀect the learning process while they do not under passive learning. While it is
the purpose of this paper to focus on the case of passive learning, i.e., the monopolist is only
uninformed about the value of θ = θ
∗ ∈ Θ,w e￿rst discuss the diﬀerence between passive and
active learning. We assume throughout this paper that the monopolist is a Bayesian learner,
i.e., Bayesian methods are used to learn about the environment. In Bayesian analysis, the
monopolist begins with prior knowledge expressed as a distribution on the parameter space
and updates its beliefs, given the data.
The monopolist is justi￿ed using Bayesian methods if the updated beliefs becomes more
accurate and precise as more data points are collected. This property is called consistency
of the posterior distribution. Consistency implies that the monopolist eventually learns the
true value of the unknown parameter. When the parameter space is ￿nitely-dimensioned,
consistency of the posterior distribution is obtained if and only if the value of the unknown
parameter lies in the support of the parameter, see Freedman [14] and Schwartz [28]. How-
1The third case in which both values of γ and θ are unknown is a combination of the ￿rst two cases.
5ever, inconsistency of Bayesian procedures is quite general in non-parametric cases, e.g., if the
parameter space is in￿nitely-dimensioned. A classical example of inconsistency is found in
Freedman [14]. The issue of consistency in nonparametrics is far from resolved. See chapter
4 in Gosh and Ramamoorthi [17] for a discussion on the consistency of Bayes procedures in
the nonparametrics case. To avoid issues of convergence of the posterior distribution to the
true values of the unknown parameters, we assume that Γ and Θ are ￿nitely-dimensioned.
However, incomplete learning can still arise in economic models. For example, incomplete
learning occurs if actions and beliefs are intertwined, such as n-armed bandit problems,
confounding action problems, and problems in which learning the exact state of the world
has no economic value. See Rothschild [27], Kihlstrom et al. [20], McLennan [23], Easley and
Kiefer [10], and Smith and S/ orensen [29], among others. This type of incomplete learning
does not arise in our class of models.
2.2.1 Active Learning
Active learning, or experimentation, arises when the monopolist￿s decisions aﬀect the infor-
mation used to learn about the unknown parameter.2,3 In our model, this is the case when
the value of γ is unknown. Let the unknown value of parameter γ be γ∗ ∈ Γ. The monopolist
begins period t with prior beliefs about γ∗ characterized by the prior p.d.f. ξ
t
γ on Γ.T h a t








j=1 qjt, the monopolist observes a random sample of J prices {Pjt}
J
j=1,
where Pjt is a realization of the random price ￿ Pjt in market j, j =1 ,...,J,i np e r i o dt.L e t
2Active learning has been studied in models in which the only link between periods is beliefs. See Prescott
[25], Grossman et al. [18], Easley and Kiefer [10,11], Balvers and Cosimano [2], Aghion et al. [1], Fusselman
and Mirman [16], Mirman et al. [24], Tre￿er [30], Creane [6], Fishman and Gandal [13], and Keller and Rady
[19].
3There is an emerging literature on the eﬀect of active learning in dynamic models of economic growth as
well as more general dynamic models, beginning with the paper of Freixas [15], but also including the works
of El-Gamal and Sundaram [12], Bertocchi and Spagat [3], and Datta et al. [7].
6φP (Pjt|qjt,γ), Pjt ∈ ΩP, be the p.d.f. of Pjt,f o re a c hj and t.4 By Bayes￿ theorem, the



























































is the likelihood function of the random sample {Pjt}
J
j=1 in period t,f o rg i v e n{qjt}
J
j=1 and
γ ∈ Γ. Notice, that the monopolist￿s supply decisions aﬀect the posterior p.d.f. (3) of γ.
Hence, active learning or experimentation is implied. Intuitively, the monopolist￿s supply
decisions may be adjusted to spread apart the distributions from which the prices are drawn,
thus making the price more informative signals of the true distribution.5
2.2.2 Passive Learning
Passive learning arises when the monopolist￿s decisions do not aﬀe c tt h ei n f o r m a t i o nu s e dt o
learn about the unknown parameter.6 T h i si st h ec a s ew h e nt h ev a l u eo fθ is unknown. In
our model, let the unknown value of parameter θ be θ
∗ ∈ Θ. The monopolist begins period
t with prior beliefs about θ
∗ characterized by the prior p.d.f. ξ
t
θ.T h a ti s ,f o ra n yX ⊂ Θ,
the monopolist￿s subjective prior probability that θ




4The distribution of ￿ Pjt is derived from the distribution of ￿ εjt,t h a ti s ,t h ep . d . f .o f ￿ Pjt is
φP (Pjt|qjt,γ)=φε (εjt|θ)
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
∂g(qjt,γ,εjt)
∂εjt
ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ ﬂ
−1
for Pjt = q
− 1
γ
jt εjt ∈ ΩP.
5The eﬀect of active learning is studied in a dynamic monop o l yw i t h o u ti n v e s t m e n ti nM i r m a ne ta l .[ 2 4 ] .
6Demers [9] studies the investment decision of a perfectly competitive ￿rm facing a random demand with
an unknown mean. The ￿rm is a passive learner not because of the structure of demand as in our class of
models, but because the ￿rm is a perfect competitor. The ￿rm has no impact on the demand and, thus,
cannot aﬀect the information, regardless of the demand structure.
7After supplying
PJ
j=1 qjt, the monopolist observes a random sample of J prices {Pjt}
J
j=1,
where Pjt is a realization of the random price ￿ Pjt in market j, j =1 ,...,J,i np e r i o dt.I tt h e n
solves for {εjt = G(Pjt,q jt,γ)}
J
j=1 in order to form posterior beliefs about θ
∗.7 By Bayes￿
















































is the likelihood function of random sample {εjt}
J
j=1 in period t,f o rθ ∈ Θ. Notice that the
monopolist￿s supply decisions cannot aﬀect the posterior p.d.f. (4). That is, there is passive
learning.
2.3 Only θ is Unknown
We now concentrate on incorporating the passive learning framework into the dynamic model
of the ￿rm. Suppose the monopolist does not know that the value of θ is θ
∗ ∈ Θ, but knows
the value of γ. Incorporating passive learning into the monopolist￿s dynamic program (2)
adds a stochastic law of motion for beliefs characterized by the posterior p.d.f. (4), along
with the deterministic law of motion for capital (1). Note that the law of motion for beliefs
(4) is autonomous, in the sense that no action of the uninformed monopolist can in￿uence
its learning.
The uninformed monopolist￿s dynamic program is summarized by the Bellman equation:8















7We assume that ∂g/∂εjt > 0f o rεjt ∈ Ωε so that Pjt = g(qjt,γ,εjt) is uniquely solvable for εjt as a
function of Pjt and qjt, i.e., there exists a function G such that εjt = G(Pjt,q jt,γ)f o re a c hPjt ∈ ΩP and
γ ∈ Γ.
8We remove the time subscipt t since the model is time-consistent. Variables in the subsequent period

























































j=1|ξ is the expectation operator over {￿ εj}
J




















is the joint p.d.f. of {￿ εj}
J
j=1, given the prior p.d.f. ξθ.9
3 Bayesian Statistics and Techniques
In general, dynamic programs with passive learning such as (5) are intractable, i.e., they
are not solvable either analytically or numerically.10 There are two main issues that need
to be addressed. First, the value function V in expression (5) depends on the variable k
and the function ξθ (θ), θ ∈ Θ.U n l e s s t h e s p a c e Θ contains a ￿nite number of elements,
the state space (k;ξθ (θ),θ ∈ Θ)i si n ￿nitely-dimensioned and it is impossible to tract the
evolution of beliefs via the p.d.f. ξθ (θ). Second, the law of motion for beliefs characterized
by the posterior p.d.f. (4) of θ, does not prevent the prior and posterior p.d.f.￿s ξθ and ￿ ξθ
from belonging to diﬀerent families of distributions. This would render the dynamic program
intractable. As observed in the stochastic law of motion (4) for beliefs, the distributional
assumption of {￿ εj}
J
j=1 aﬀects the posterior distribution ￿ ξθ. Therefore, ξθ and ￿ ξθ may not
belong to the same family of distributions for any likelihood function L of {￿ εj}
J








is also called the marginal likelihood function of {￿ εj}
J
j=1.
10The problem is not whether a solution exists but whether one can characterize the solution and study
it.
9most likelihood functions L of {￿ εj}
J
j=1 yield a posterior p.d.f. ￿ ξθ that is not in the family of
distributions to which ξθ belongs. For instance, suppose that the prior p.d.f. of parameter
￿ θ is normal with mean ￿ and variance σ2. For most likelihood functions L of {￿ εj}
J
j=1,t h e
posterior p.d.f. of ￿ θ given {εj}
J
j=1 is not normally distributed and the characterization of the
posterior p.d.f. is, in general, intractable.
We therefore make speci￿c assumptions about the distributions of the random sample
{￿ εj}
J
j=1 and the prior distribution ξθ so that the state space (k;ξθ (θ),θ ∈ Θ)i s￿nitely-
dimensioned and the prior and posterior beliefs belong to the same family of distributions.
To that end, we focus on the class of distributions of random sample {￿ εj}
J
j=1 that have a
￿xed number s ≥ 1o fs u ﬃcient statistics. We ￿rst de￿ne the notion of suﬃcient statistics
and present a result that asserts that if L has a suﬃcient statistic, then there exists a prior
p.d.f. ξθ such that ξθ and ￿ ξθ belong to the same family. Focusing on the class of distributions
of random sample {￿ εj}
J
j=1 that have a ￿xed number s ≥ 1o fs u ﬃcient statistics addresses
the issues of tractability as well as ensuring that the prior and posterior p.d.f.￿s of θ are in
the same family of distributions.
3.1 Suﬃcient Statistics
The treatment of the data is simpli￿ed if a few numerical values, or statistics, summarize the
relevant information of the data. Such summaries are known as suﬃcient statistics. Loosely
speaking, a statistic TJ is called a suﬃcient statistic if, for any prior distribution of ￿ θ,i t s
posterior distribution depends on the random sample {￿ εj}
J









































































is suﬃcient to compute the posterior distribution of ￿ θ from any prior
distribution and any data set {εj}
J
j=1.
3.2 Conjugate Prior Distributions
If the random sample {￿ εj}
J
j=1 is drawn from a family of distributions for which there is a
suﬃcient statistic of ￿xed dimension, then there exists a family of distributions of ￿ θ that
is closed under sampling. That is, if the prior distribution of ￿ θ belongs to a family of
distributions, then for any sample size J and any values of the observations {￿ εj}
J
j=1,t h e
posterior distribution of ￿ θ also belongs to the same family. This family of distributions
is also called a conjugate family of distributions because of the special relationship that
exists between this family of distributions of the unknown parameter ￿ θ and the family of
distributions of the observations {￿ εj}
J
j=1. Formally,

















of ￿xed dimension s ≥ 1 for every sample size J,t h e r ee x i s t sa
conjugate family of distributions for the unknown parameter ￿ θ.
Proof. See DeGroot [8], p. 163.
Many families of likelihood functions have a suﬃcient statistic of ￿xed dimensions s ≥ 1,
for every sample size J. For instance, the exponential family of distributions has a suﬃcient
statistic of ￿xed dimension s ≥ 1, independent of the size J.11
Focusing on the family of likelihood functions that have a suﬃcient statistic of ￿xed
dimensions s ≥ 1 for every sample size J ensures not only that there exists a prior p.d.f. ξθ
such that ξθ and ￿ ξθ belong the same family but also that ξθ and ￿ ξθ can be characterized by a












be N variables characterizing the prior and posterior p.d.f.
11See chapter 9 ￿Conjugate Prior Distributions￿ in DeGroot [8] for a detailed discussion on conjugate
families of distributions.
11of ￿ θ, respectively.12 Assuming a family of likelihood functions that have a suﬃcient statistic
of ￿xed dimensions s ≥ 1 for every sample size J allows us to rewrite dynamic program (5)



















































4T h e E ﬀect of Learning
4.1 Assumptions
In order to study the maximization problem of the monopolist, we postulate the demand
function ￿ Pj = q
− 1
γ
j ￿ εj in market j,w h e r eγ > 1 is the elasticity of demand and ln￿ εj ∼
N (θ,1/r). Since the family of lognormal distributions for the random sample {￿ εj}
J
j=1 belongs
to the exponential family of distributions, there exists a conjugate family of distributions for
the unknown parameter ￿ θ. The conjugate family of distributions for ￿ θ is normal with mean
ρ and precision τ > 0. Using (4), the posterior beliefs about ￿ θ are normally distributed, i.e.,
￿ θ ∼ N (￿ ρ,1/(τ + Jr)), where










is the posterior mean. The posterior mean (7) is a weighted average of the prior mean ρ
and the sample mean εJ =( 1 /J)
PJ
j=1 lnεj.T h e w e i g h t s o f ρ and εJ are proportional to






























12τ and Jr, respectively. The higher the precision of the prior distribution of ￿ θ,t h eg r e a t e r
the weight that is given to the prior mean ρ, while the greater the size of the data set J
or the higher the precision of the data-generating process r, the greater the weight that is
given to the sample mean εJ. Note also that the variance of the posterior distribution of
￿ θ is decreasing in J. More price observations reveal more information about the unknown
parameter θ. Note also that under our distributional assumptions, the posterior mean (7) is
a consistent estimate of E [ln￿ εjt]=θ
∗, implying that the Bayesian estimate of E [￿ εjt]i sa l s o
consistent. Formally,
















Proof. Use Kolmogorov￿s strong law of large number on the posterior mean (7).
Therefore, the uninformed monopolist￿s beliefs about parameter θ converges in prob-
ability to the true value θ
∗, implying that the Bayesian estimate on ￿ εj also converges to
eθ∗+1/2r. Without consistency of the Bayes procedure, using Bayesian methods does not lead
to learning about the environment.
Further assumptions are needed to study the eﬀect of learning in this model. The mo-




γ +( 1− α)χ
· γ
γ−1
, α ∈ (0,1], χ ≥ 0,13

















ν ≥ 0, β > 0, φ,η ≥ 1, and
φη − β =1− 1/γ > 0, (8)
13If α =1 ,t h e nf (k)=k, which corresponds to a market trading a nonrenewable resource.
13γ > 1.14,15
Therefore, the dynamic program (6) for the uninformed monopolist is rewritten as
























14The restriction φη − β =1− 1/γ serves two purposes. First, it yields closed-form solutions of the
monopolist￿s optimal supply and investment decisions. Second, it is a suﬃcient condition ensuring that
an interior solution always exists with strictly positive pro￿ts. That is, the restriction rules out any exit
strategy. Suppose that
φη < 1 − 1/γ,
then it is possible that the monopolist exits permanently.
15The cost function we use is very general and admits diﬀerent scenarios. Consider three of them.
1. The case of η =1a n dφ > 1. Here, the monopolist employs lj workers to produce qj for market j,
e.g., the monopolist employs lj ￿shermen in market j to extract the stock of ￿sh k.T h e￿nal-output
production is of the form
qj = f (k)
α lσ
j
and the cost function for labor lj is νl
ψ
























where β ≡ αψ/σ and φ ≡ ψ/σ.
2. The case of η > 1a n dφ = 1. The monopolist centralizes production. The ￿nal-output production is
of the form










































where β ≡ αψ/σ and η ≡ ψ/σ.















































































where the pair {bn}
2


























is the joint p.d.f. of {￿ εj}
J
j=1 given
the uninformed monopolist￿s beliefs about θ.
4.2 The Benchmark Model
In order to measure the eﬀect of learning on the monopolist￿s behavior, we solve the dynamic
program for the informed monopolist, i.e., the value of θ is θ
∗ ∈ Θ. Then, the informed
monopolist￿s dynamic program is














































































is the joint p.d.f. of {￿ εj}
J
j=1 given the
information of the informed monopolist about θ. Note that the stock of capital is the only
state variable for the informed monopolist￿s dynamic program.
154.3 The Supply and Investment Strategies
The next two propositions present the optimal supply and investment strategies of the un-
informed and informed monopolists, respectively.
Proposition 4 If the monopolist is uninformed, i.e., dynamic program (10), then QU =








































γ − αδ (1 − ζJωU)
, (12)
where ωU ≡ ωU (ρ,τ).
Proposition 5 If the monopolist is informed, i.e., dynamic program (11), then QI = ωIf (k)








































γ − αδ (1 − ζJωI)
. (13)
Note that ωU (ρ,τ)a n dωI are similar since expressions (12) and (13) have the same
structure. The only diﬀerence between expressions (12) and (13) is the expectation of the
demand shock given the information available to the monopolist. The uninformed monopo-
list￿s expected mean of the demand shock is eρ+r+τ
2rτ while the informed monopolist￿s is eθ∗+ 1
2r.
Therefore, the other structural parameters γ, η, φ, ν, J, β, α, δ,a n dζ aﬀect the supply
16and investment decisions in the same direction, whether the monopolist is uninformed or
informed. They only diﬀer in magnitude because of diﬀerences on the expectation of the
demand shock.
Note also that the uninformed monopolist￿s share of output to each market ωU (ρ,τ)
evolves over time as beliefs are updated after each period since ρ and τ a r et w os t a t ev a r i a b l e s
with the autonomous laws of motion (7) and ￿ τ = τ + Jr. This does not happen with the
informed monopolist since ωI is ￿xed over time.
The Cost Function. The presence of a cost function is essential in our model for
learning to aﬀect behavior. Formally,
Proposition 6 I ft h e r ei sn oc o s t ,i . e . ,ν =0 , then learning does not aﬀect the monopolist￿s
behavior, i.e., whether or not the monopolist knows that the value of θ is θ
∗,





is supplied to market j and




When there is no cost, ν = 0, the uncertainty in demand is multiplicative. Therefore,
the information about the distribution of the demand shock does not aﬀect the monopolist￿s
behavior. When ν > 0, the uncertainty is no longer multiplicative and it follows that
Proposition 7 If there is a cost, i.e., ν > 0,t h e nl e a r n i n ga ﬀects the monopolist￿s behavior.
1. If eρ+r+τ
2rτ >e θ∗+ 1
2r, then QU >Q I and ￿ KU < ￿ KI.
2. If eρ+r+τ
2rτ <e θ∗+ 1
2r, then QU <Q I and ￿ KU > ￿ KI.
3. If eρ+r+τ
2rτ = eθ∗+ 1
2r, then QU = QI and ￿ KU = ￿ KI.
In other words, from Proposition 7, beliefs about the demand shock aﬀect the ￿rm￿s
behavior. When the uninformed monopolist has more pessimistic beliefs about the mean
17of the demand shock than the informed monopolist, i.e., eρ+r+τ
2rτ <e θ∗+ 1
2r,t h e nl e a r n i n g
decreases supply and increases investment. When the uninformed monopolist has more
optimistic beliefs about the mean of the demand shock than the informed monopolist, i.e.,
eρ+r+τ
2rτ >e θ∗+ 1
2r, then learning increases supply and decreases investment.
It is worth noting that a higher precision of the beliefs, i.e., a higher τ, decreases the
expectation of the demand shock, i.e., eρ+r+τ
2rτ is negatively related to the precision τ of beliefs.
This means that ∂QU/∂τ < 0. This is due to the lognormality of the demand shock that
makes the precision τ part of the mean of the demand shock.
Correct Beliefs. Suppose now that the uninformed monopolist has correct beliefs about
the value of θ but remains uninformed. Two cases are studied. First, suppose that ρ = θ
∗,
then
Proposition 8 If there is a cost, i.e., ν > 0,a n dρ = θ
∗,t h e neρ+r+τ
2rτ >e θ∗+ 1
2r and QU >Q I
and ￿ KU < ￿ KI.
In other words, from Proposition 8, the uninformed monopolist supplies more than the
informed monopolist when ρ = θ
∗. Although the uninformed monopolist faces more uncer-
tainty than the informed monopolist since τ < +∞ and, has a higher expectation of the
demand shock, since eρ+r+τ
2rτ >e θ∗+ 1
2r. Therefore, the uninformed monopolist supplies more
and invests less.
Second, suppose that the uninformed monopolist incorrect beliefs about the value of θ,
but has correct beliefs about the expectation of the demand shocks, i.e., ρ = θ
∗ − 1/τ and
thus eρ+r+τ
2rτ = eθ∗+ 1
2r,t h e n
Proposition 9 If there is a cost, i.e., ν > 0,a n dρ = θ
∗ − 1/τ,t h e neρ+r+τ
2rτ = eθ∗+ 1
2r and
QU = QI and ￿ KU = ￿ KI.
In other words, from Proposition 9, learning has no eﬀect on the monopolist￿s supply
and investment decisions when the expectation on the demand shock is the same for both
the uninformed and informed monopolists. In our class of models, if eρ+r+τ
2rτ = eθ∗+ 1
2r,t h e n






































U is the likelihood function of the uninformed monopolist, given its beliefs about θ
while L∗
I is the likelihood function of the informed monopolist, given that θ = θ
∗ is known.
In the static case, under expression (14), QU = QI, since the uninformed and informed
monopolists maximize the same objective function. In our class of models, expression (14)
is equivalent to eρ+r+τ
2rτ = eθ∗+ 1
2r,r e s u l t i n gi nQU = QI.

































































while the informed monopolist￿s dynamic program is




































When the uncertainty is multiplicative in demand, expression (14) holds if and only if
eρ+r+τ
2rτ = eθ∗+ 1























































































































































Otherwise, it is not necessarily the case that the expected continuation of the value function
is of the form (16) and QU = QI when expression (14) holds regardless of the demand
structure.
4.4 The Steady State Levels of Supply and Capital
Although learning aﬀects the monopolist￿s supply and investment decisions, it does not
change the steady state levels of supply and capital because the uninformed monopolist
becomes informed about the value of the unknown parameter θ in the limit. Incomplete









∗ and τ →∞ . However, learning aﬀects the rate of convergence to the steady
state. In particular, if the uninformed monopolist is more optimistic than the informed
monopolist, i.e., eρ+r+τ
2rτ >e θ∗+ 1
2r,t h e nQU >Q I. As a result, learning slows down the
20convergence rate toward the steady state if and only if k<K,w h e r eK the steady state
level of capital. On the other hand, if the uninformed monopolist is less optimistic than the
informed monopolist, i.e., eρ+r+τ
2rτ <e θ∗+ 1
2r,t h e nQU <Q I. As a result, learning speeds up
the convergence rate toward the steady state if and only of k<K.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 4


















is strictly concave. Then, we show that the value function is of the form
VU (k,ρ,τ)=Z1 (ρ,τ)k
1− 1
η + Z2 (ρ,τ), (18)
where Z1 (ρ,τ),Z 2 (ρ,τ) > 0 are functions of ρ and τ, but not k, and that the optimal



















Note that ωU (ρ,τ) < (ζJ)
−1 implies that some output is invested for next period, i.e.,







implies that the instantaneous pro￿t function (17) is strictly positive in equilibrium.
1. Recall that the restrictions on the values of the parameters are γ > 1, ν > 0, β > 0,
21η,φ ≥ 1, δ ∈ [0,1], ζ > 0, and
φη − β =1− 1/γ.
The Hessian H of expression (17) evaluated at the symmetric optimal quantity sup-




































η−2 (η − 1)φQ
φη−2
U ,
j 6= m, j,m =1 ,...,J. Given the restrictions on the values of the parameters,
Hjj < Hjm < 0, and Hjm = H￿ ￿ m,f o ra l lj,m,￿ , ￿ m =1 ,...,J.T h e r e f o r e , t h e
determinants of the principal minors are of the right sign and H is negative def-
















2. Updating the value function (18) and plugging it into value function (10) yields





























































































































j =1 ,...,J. Considering a symmetric optimal supply function of the form QU =
ωU (ρ,τ)f (k), where ωU (ρ,τ) is a function of the state variables ρ and τ,t h e￿rst-





















z1 (1 − ζJωU)
− 1
γ =0 , (22)
for all j,s i n c eφη−β =1−1/γ.16 Using the fact that QU = ωUf (k), the value function

















































(1 − α)χ + δz2,
≡ Z1 (ρ,τ)k
1− 1


































,a n dw h e r ez2 is de￿n e di ne x p r e s s i o n( 2 0 ) .
Plugging expression (23) into the ￿rst-order condition (22), using assumption (8), and
16We write ωU instead of ωU (ρ,τ) to simplify notation.





























γ − αδ(1 − ζJωU)
≡ h(ωU).
(24)





while the right-hand side is



















































·2 < 0, (26)












,s i n c e






























2rτ − νJη−1 (ζJ)
−β






















 = −∞. (28)
24(b) The properties of h(ωU)a r e
i.

















γ − αδ(1 − ζJωU)
> 0, (30)























and (1 − ζJωU)
1












































































3. Therefore, given the parametric assumptions and combining properties (25), (26), (27),




































0 <Z 1 (ρ,τ),Z 2 (ρ,τ),z 1,z 2 < ∞ and are functions of ρ and τ, but not k,a n dt h e
value function is bounded and of the form
VU (k,ρ,τ)=Z1 (ρ,τ)k
1− 1
γ + Z2 (ρ,τ) > 0.










































for the dynamic program (10).
5.2 Proof of Proposition 5
Proving proposition 5 involves similar steps to those in the proof of proposition 4. The










































γ − αδ(1 − ζJωI)
≡ h(ωI).
(33)
5.3 Proof of Propositions 7, 8, and 9






























γ − αδ(1 − ζJωU)
≡ h(ωU),





































































⇔ ωU S ωI ⇔ QU S QI.
Propositions 7, 8, and 9 follow.
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